October 27, 2004
MESMERIZED BY MISSILE-GAP BUNKUM:
The Cuban Missile Crisis Myth You Probably Believe (Sheldon M. Stern, 10/27/04, History News Network)
Several months after the publication of Averting ‘The Final Failure’: John F. Kennedy and the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings (Stanford University Press, 2003), my narrative history of the Cuban missile crisis ExComm meetings, I received a call from a production company preparing a television program about letters by American presidents. They asked if I might be interested in discussing John F. Kennedy’s missile crisis letters to Nikita Khrushchev. I explained that these letters were not really JFK letters at all, since they had been composed by committee rather than by Kennedy himself. I suggested instead that we might discuss one of the most famous incidents relating to the Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence: on the evening of October 26, the Soviet leader sent a letter offering to remove the missiles from Cuba if the U.S. pledged not to invade the island nation. But, early on October 27, Khrushchev demanded that the U.S. also withdraw its Jupiter missiles from Turkey. According to the traditional view, Robert Kennedy suggested accepting the proposal in Khrushchev’s first letter and simply ignoring the second message. This strategy, which presumably led to resolving the crisis, came to be called the “Trollope Ploy”—a reference to a plot device by nineteenth-century British novelist Anthony Trollope, in which a woman interprets a casual romantic gesture, such as squeezing her hand, as a marriage proposal.The producer seemed interested in including a “revisionist” perspective in the program and we later did fifteen minutes of filming in which I carefully explained that the Trollope Ploy is a great story, but the ExComm tapes prove that it never really happened. When the program was broadcast, however, the editors cut quickly from my five seconds to actor Martin Sheen—who had played JFK in a 1983 dramatization of the missile crisis. Sheen recapitulated the standard account of the Trollope Ploy and praised its brilliance in helping the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. avoid nuclear war. The filmmakers apparently decided that the conventional explanation was less complicated and made a more dramatic story.
In fact, even among historians and ExComm participants the Trollope Ploy remains an all but immovable fixture in the legend and lore of the Cuban missile crisis. [...]
President Kennedy himself immediately seized on the political benefit in this explanation of the settlement of the crisis since the secret agreement to remove the U.S. missiles from Turkey was just that—top secret—and remained so for decades. Only hours after Khrushchev publicly agreed to remove the missiles, JFK phoned former Presidents Eisenhower, Truman and Hoover—and deliberately misinformed them. He accurately reported that Khrushchev, on Friday, had privately suggested withdrawing the missiles in exchange for an American promise not to invade Cuba; but, on Saturday, the Kremlin leader had sent a public message offering to remove the missiles if the U.S. pulled its Jupiter missiles out of Turkey. President Kennedy informed Eisenhower, “we couldn’t get into that deal;” assured Truman, “they … accepted the earlier proposal;” and told Hoover that Khrushchev had gone back “to their more reasonable [Friday] position.” Eisenhower, who had dealt personally with Khrushchev, asked skeptically if the Soviets had tried to attach any other conditions. “No,” Kennedy replied disingenuously, “except that we’re not gonna invade Cuba.” The former president, aware of only half the truth, concluded, “this is a very, I think, conciliatory move he’s made.” Such deceptions shaped the administration’s cover story and helped generate the notion of the Trollope Ploy—which was indelibly fixed in public consciousness by the 1974 television film, “The Missiles of October,” based on RFK’s book.
In fact, listening carefully to the recently declassified ExComm tapes proves conclusively that the notion of the Trollope Ploy was actually invented to conceal the real agreement to remove U.S. missiles from Turkey. It is a myth; it simply did not happen that way—much like the resilient fable that Lincoln dashed off the Gettysburg Address on the back of an envelope.
The problem isn't simply that the Kennedy brothers surrendered to nuclear blackmail, guaranteed Castro's regime, and emboldened the Soviets for the next twenty years but that they did so because they completely misunderstood how weak the USSR really was. Had they just chosen to juke it out right then millions of lives and trillions of dollars would have been saved and the social displacement of the 60s and 70s would have been avoided. Posted by Orrin Judd at October 27, 2004 10:19 AM
From what I understand, the Soviets did not think they won the Cuban Missle Crisis and that's why they sacked Khruschev afterward.
Posted by: Chris Durnell at October 27, 2004 11:32 AMHard to risk turning cities into glass lined craters over the future unknowns.
Posted by: Jeff Guinn at October 27, 2004 11:55 AMJeff: Indeed.
Come on, Orrin, do you think that would have avoided "social displacement"? How about handling the public relations for the US having nuked the USSR, killing tens of millions? For losing some American cities to Russian nukes? I doubt a nuked USSR would have suddenly turned into a friendly democracy, either. That occupation would have made Iraq look like a picnic.
Posted by: PapayaSF at October 27, 2004 12:19 PMHave you heard about General LeMay's post-crisis confrontation with Kennedy? There wouldn't have been any need for an occupation -- the fireballs would have overlapped over the entire length and width of ALL Russia's populated areas.
Unfortunately for LeMay, this victory would have used 10-20 times the megatonnage needed to cause a full Nuclear Winter (even in the best-case, non-PC/activist estimates) over all the globe.
Posted by: Ken at October 27, 2004 01:04 PMJeff/Papaya:
The Soviets had nio such capacity.
Ken:
Nuclear Winter? No one buys that anymore--it was just Sagan advocating appeasement.
Posted by: oj at October 27, 2004 01:51 PMThe most interesting communication on display at the JFK Library is a missive from Castro to Kruschev pleading with him to nuke the USA.
That must have sparked a realization he, Mr. K, was dealing with a madman.
I wish Mr. Castro a slow and painfull death.
Posted by: Genecis at October 27, 2004 01:52 PMThere is no realistic way to view JFK's behavior as other than surrender to the Soviet threat. He betrayed the brave Cubans and committed Eastern Europeans to another generation of slavery. This is not to be unexpected.
The father sucked up to the Nazis, the children sucked up to the Communists.
One can only hope Kennedys keep dying off or spiraling into political irrelevance.
"The Soviets had no such capacity."
The heck they didn't.
Not only did they have it, but to a far greater extent than we, they felt they could fight and win a nuclear war.
It is the second part that focused people's attention.
Posted by: Jeff Guinn at October 27, 2004 03:17 PMIt's delusional to believe that the USSR had no capability to nuke the US, even if they had far less ability than Americans feared.
The Soviets managed to produce some of the better tanks of WW II, and some of the better aircraft and space vehicles of the late 20th century, as well as the most widely used assault rifle.
Their missiles in the 60s were just as good, just as likely to work, as the US' were, which is to say not well but adequately.
As for the "Nuclear Winter" scenario, while it's true that such an event wouldn't have, (or won't, if we actually do have a nuclear war in the future), caused the extinction of humanity, it would now kill in the high hundreds of millions, possibly billions, due to starvation and disease. The average temperature in America could decrease by 15° for several years, shortening growing seasons, and the ash suspended in the atmosphere would cause severe lung problems.
www.bbc.co.uk/science/horizon/1999/supervolcanoes_script.shtml
(The above is good reading for those who like to scare themselves/know about near-inevitable future cataclysms).
Further, although an early (before the end of the 60s) nuclear war with the USSR might have been a net good, it's interesting to compare and contrast some people's distain for realpolitiks with the cold-blooded decision, worthy of a Vulcan, to kill hundreds of millions of people, many of them American citizens, in order to free Central America, parts of Asia, Eastern Europe, and the Russians (those few that survived, anyway), from Communist oppression.
Not all oppression, mind you, for few of those nations would have been democratic republics, especially after the prime example of democracy just blew up half the world.
However, better a run of the mill totalitarian dictator, rather than a Communist one, eh ?
It's delusional to believe that the USSR had no capability to nuke the US, even if they had far less ability than Americans feared.
The Soviets managed to produce some of the better tanks of WW II, and some of the better aircraft and space vehicles of the late 20th century, as well as the most widely used assault rifle.
Their missiles in the 60s were just as good, just as likely to work, as the US' were, which is to say not well but adequately.
As for the "Nuclear Winter" scenario, while it's true that such an event wouldn't have, (or won't, if we actually do have a nuclear war in the future), caused the extinction of humanity, it would now kill in the high hundreds of millions, possibly billions, due to starvation and disease. The average temperature in America could decrease by 15° for several years, shortening growing seasons, and the ash suspended in the atmosphere would cause severe lung problems.
www.bbc.co.uk/science/horizon/1999/supervolcanoes_script.shtml
(The above is good reading for those who like to scare themselves/know about near-inevitable future cataclysms).
Further, although an early (before the end of the 60s) nuclear war with the USSR might have been a net good, it's interesting to compare and contrast some people's distain for realpolitiks with the cold-blooded decision, worthy of a Vulcan, to kill hundreds of millions of people, many of them American citizens, in order to free Central America, parts of Asia, Eastern Europe, and the Russians (those few that survived, anyway), from Communist oppression.
Not all oppression, mind you, for few of those nations would have been democratic republics, especially after the prime example of democracy just blew up half the world.
However, better a run of the mill totalitarian dictator, rather than a Communist one, eh ?
Nuclear Winter? No one buys that anymore--it was just Sagan advocating appeasement.
Well, if LeMay had poured all of SAC into Russian targets, we'd know for sure -- one way or the other. Do you want to take that risk?
Or is "I'M RIGHT! YOU'RE WRONG! HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA!" more important?
Or doesn't it matter because you KNOW you'll be Raptured into Heaven while the warheads are cutting atmosphere just before detonation? (I ran into WAY too many "Christians for Nuclear War" during Hal Lindsay's heyday...)
Posted by: Ken at October 27, 2004 04:14 PMNo subs, no ICBMs, no nuclear weapon equipped bombers.
Yeah, right.
Posted by: Jeff Guinn at October 27, 2004 07:49 PMKennedy's mistake was at the begining of his administration. He should have used the entire available force of the American Military to remove Castro. The Bay of Pigs Fiasco casued the Russians to think him feckless and and cowardly, despite the fine rhetoric of his inaugural. What followed were the Berlin wall, the Missle Crissis and Indo-China.
The train of evils that has followed on that bit of cowardace has not yet come to a halt. Just as the consequences of Carter's cowardace in Iran are still being felt.
Posted by: Robert Schwartz at October 27, 2004 09:21 PMLeMay also said (to Nimitz and Spruance) that he was wasted his time bombing kamikaze bases in Kyushu, and that he could defeat Japan by bombing industrial centers.
He was wrong both times.
LeMay was a deranged nutcase, and he got more deranged as time went by.
You might have thought that, by 1962, the hobby of underestimating Russian military capabilities would have lost most of its charm.
Posted by: Harry Eagar at October 28, 2004 12:09 AMThe kamikazes didn't matter whereas LeMay ended Japan's capacity to wage war.
Posted by: oj at October 28, 2004 07:20 AMHarry
Respectfully disagree with you on Lemay.
Nutcase? I can see where a sane person might go nutty argueing with Robert McNamarra about sending ground troops into a guerrilla war in South Vietnam, while not bombing the source of the problem in Hanoi.
Wrong on both counts? How?
Nagasaki, Hiroshima. Was not that an extention of the Lemay doctrine? Which again led to the saving of lives of American soldiers.
Posted by: h-man at October 28, 2004 08:49 AMh:
LeMay was an anti-Soviet/anti-Communist--Harry dislikes them all.
Posted by: oj at October 28, 2004 08:54 AMSpruance, a genuine warrior who had been in combat, as opposed to the blustery carpet knight LeMay, laughed at LeMay, notably at his claims to "do precision bombing through 10-10ths cloud cover."
All the strategic bombers were psychotic, claiming to put bombs in pickle barrels from 30,000 feet when in fact they were lucky to get one in the same county with their aiming point.
The carpet bombing of the kamikaze airfields actually worked to hold down the attacks on the fleet, though LeMay didn't think so. Postwar surveys proved he was wrong, as he was about almost everything..
The fleet had beaten Japan by blockade. Given Japanese psychology, being beaten didn't mean you stopped fighting. But at some point, running a modern army requires fuel, and the Navy deprived Japan of that.
Neither Nimitz nor Spruance believed an invasion of the home islands would be necessary. They were right, but the question of how long it would have taken to get a surrender remains an open question.
Anyhow, LeMay started out crazy and went downhill after that.
Posted by: Harry Eagar at October 28, 2004 07:45 PMSurrender wasn't necessary--it was over. Should have used the nukes on Stalin.
Posted by: oj at October 28, 2004 09:51 PMHarry is right about LeMay. He long overstayed his usefulness to the AF, and practically crippled tactical airpower.
Posted by: Jeff Guinn at October 29, 2004 07:09 AMneeded strategic to take out the USSR so we could avoid tactical messes like Vietnam.
Posted by: oj at October 29, 2004 07:34 AMLeMay wasn't even any use in the preatomic age.
When Nimitz finally landed in Japan in August 1945, he was 'pleased' (according to his friend and biographer Potter) to learn that despite LeMay's strategic bombing of Tokyo for almost a year, the Yokosuka Naval Base was entirely undamaged and ready to go to work immediately to service the conqueror's fleet.
It's hard to quantify, but you can make a pretty good argument that the strategic bombers prolonged the war. It cost us more to drop a bomb than it did the Germans or Japanese to clean up after it.
LeMay was psychotic, divorced from reality.
Had nothing to do with Bolshevism. He was just psychotic.
Posted by: Harry Eagar at October 29, 2004 05:47 PMoj:
I see that you didn't address the nuclear winter issue, which would have been a BIG problem, even if it was only the US carpet-nukeing a helpless USSR, and no bombs fell in America.
Also unaddressed is why you feel that killing 50 million Russians and another 500 million worldwide, including millions of Americans, was a price worth paying to free Eastern Europe and parts of Asia.
Posted by: Michael Herdegen at October 31, 2004 09:03 AMNuclear winter was a hoax and the failure to depose your own totalitarian regime makes you fair game when we have to do it for you.
Posted by: oj at October 31, 2004 09:17 AM